b e rna rd s . bl ac k a m y r . wag n e r z e n o n z a b i n sk i A B S T R A C T According to tort law theory, medical malpractice liability may deter negligence by healthcare providers. However, advocates of malpractice reform often argue that most malpractice claims are unrelated to provider performance. We study the connection between hospital adverse events and malpractice claim rates in the two states with public data sets on medical malpractice claim rates: Florida and Texas. We use Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs), developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, to measure rates for 17 types of adverse events. Hospitals with high rates for one PSI usually have high rates for other PSIs. We find a strong association between PSI rates and malpractice claim rates with extensive control variables and hospital fixed effects (in Florida) or county fixed effects (in Texas). Our results, if causal, provide evidence that malpractice claims leading to payouts are not random events. Instead, hospitals that improve patient safety can reduce malpractice payouts.
I. Introduction
A central goal of tort liability is to deter risky or negligent behavior by imposing liability on the "acting" party for harm to an injured party. This creates incentives for the acting party to take precautions to prevent injury. However, if tort suits are unrelated, or only weakly related, to actual injury or negligence, tort liability may impose costs on acting parties without creating appropriate incentives to change behavior.
In the United States, medical patients who believe they have been the victims of negligent medical care may attempt to recover damages by bringing medical malpractice lawsuits against health-care providers. The threat of suit may deter negligence by providers. However, advocates of caps on noneconomic damages and other reforms that would discourage malpractice suits argue that the medical malpractice liability system in the United States is largely a "lawsuit lottery," in which many claims are filed in cases with no negligence and juries often award damages in cases with no negligence (American Medical Association 2012) . At the same time, a high proportion of medical injuries with apparent negligence do not lead to malpractice claims (Baker 2005a) . If malpractice suits are weakly related to negligent care, the risk of being sued will not create incentives for hospitals to invest in care quality. Conversely, a strong association between adverse patient safety events and medical malpractice claim rates suggests that hospitals can reduce malpractice claims by making the investments-often in people and training rather than capital equipmentneeded to reduce adverse events.
We study here the association between rates of adverse patient safety events and rates for paid medical malpractice claims (below, simply "claims" or "malpractice claims"), using data from Florida and Texas, the only states with publicly available data on these claims. In Florida, we find evidence, with hospital fixed effects and extensive covariates, that adverse event rates predict malpractice claim rates. Our point estimates suggest hospitals can meaningfully reduce malpractice claims by investing in patient safety. An improvement from one standard deviation above to one standard deviation below the expected adverse event rate predicts a 32 percent drop in paid malpractice claims. In Texas, we have only county-level data on malpractice claim rates, but obtain similar point estimates, using county fixed effects.
The prior literature examining the relationship between patient safety and medical malpractice claim rates is limited. The principal study is Greenberg et al. (2010) , who study the relationship between adverse events and malpractice claim rates in California. They find that county-level variation in adverse event rates predicts variation in malpractice claim rates.
1 This study is subject to several limitations, however. They lack hospital-level data on malpractice claims, so cannot control for hospital-level confounders. Their data cover only a subset of insurers from one state, and their measure of adverse events is a raw sum of events, which gives dominant weight to high frequency (often low severity) events. They also do not link specific types of adverse events to specific types of malpractice claims. We address these shortfalls, using hospital-level data from Florida.
Our study is also related to ex post studies of whether the medical malpractice lawsuits that are brought appear to involve actual negligence. These studies generally find that many, but far from all, malpractice claims involve probable medical error. The leading study is Studdert et al. (2006) ; see also the review of earlier studies by Baker (2005b) . We also contribute to a broader literature studying the factors that predict malpractice claims. For physicians, one malpractice claim predicts future claims (Bovjberg and Patient Safety and Medical Malpractice Risk // bl ac k et a l.
Petronis 1994; Sloan et al. 1989) . A personal style that leads to patient complaints also increases malpractice risk (Hickson et al. 2002) .
We complement the malpractice claim data with data on adverse patient safety events, using Florida and Texas "state inpatient data sets," which cover all hospital discharges from each state. We use these inpatient data sets to measure rates for 17 Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs). The PSIs were developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and provide measures of patient safety by capturing often-avoidable adverse events, such as wound or bloodstream infections, or sponges left in the body during surgery.
Our underlying causal model is the following: (1) the PSIs, especially when pooled, are a proxy for overall patient safety; (2) poor patient safety practices cause medical errors captured by the PSIs, and also likely proxy for other unobserved causes of medical errors; and (3) some medical errors lead to malpractice claims. Although we lack an external shock to PSI rates, our results are likely to be causal. Reverse causation is not a plausible explanation, because higher malpractice risk should, if anything, induce hospitals to pay more attention to patient safety. This should reduce PSI rates. Thus, any reverse causation should bias our estimates downward. For causal inference, the more serious concern is omitted variable bias. However, we have a strong empirical specification, especially in Florida where we can use hospital fixed effects (hospital FE). We combine the hospital FE with extensive patient-level covariates that should control for any changes in patient mix over time. Patient mix and hospital characteristics should also be reasonably stable over time, so unobserved patient and hospital characteristics should be largely captured by the hospital FE.
To determine whether PSI rates predict malpractice claim rates, we adopt a two-step approach. First, we construct measures of residual claim rates and PSI rates, controlling for an array of hospital-level covariates. These residual measures capture whether a hospital has more adverse events or malpractice claims than one would expect, based on the covariates. The residual PSI measures are positively correlated, suggesting that, especially when pooled, they are a reasonable proxy for (unobserved) overall "patient safety."
In the second step, we use panel data methods to assess whether the residual PSI measure predicts the residual malpractice claims measure. We find a strong positive association between residual PSI rates and residual malpractice claim rates. This suggests that paid malpractice claims are nonrandom events, and that hospitals can reduce their paid claim rates by improving patient safety. For Florida, the coefficient on our pooled PSI measure is 0.141. If our results are causal, this implies that a one standard deviation reduction in PSI rates would decrease paid malpractice claims by about 16 percent.
We also document substantial variation in PSI rates at the hospital level. For example, among the 106 "large" Florida hospitals in our data set (>10,000 discharges in 2010), annual total PSI rates range from 55 to 390 per 10,000 discharges (σ = 53). This wide variation in PSI rates implies that much lower PSI rates are achievable at reasonable cost, since some hospitals are achieving them. This paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background on medical malpractice litigation and patient safety in the United States. Section III describes our data sources, and Section IV details our empirical methodology. Section V presents our main, hospital-level results from Florida on the association between PSI rates and malpractice claim rates. Section VI shows that we obtain similar results in Texas, with county-level malpractice claim data. Section VII discusses our findings and their implications, and Section VIII concludes.
II. Background

A. M E D I C A L M A L P R A C T I C E L I T I G A T I O N
In the United States and many other countries, patients may bring lawsuits against healthcare providers alleging injury due to negligent care. If liability is found, the claimant may recover economic damages, noneconomic damages, and punitive damages. Economic damages are composed of monetary losses due to the injury including medical expenses and lost earnings. Noneconomic damages are nonmonetary harm, such as pain and suffering. Punitive damages are available in theory, but are rarely awarded in practice, and even more rarely paid (Hyman et al. 2007 ).
Reform of the US medical malpractice system has long been a contested public policy issue (American Medical Association 2012). The principal arguments made by the American Medical Association and other reform advocates include claims that liability fears lead providers to practice "defensive medicine," driving up health-care costs (e.g., Kessler and McClellan 1996, 2002; Sloan and Shadle 2009; Paik, Black, and Hyman 2017) ; and claims that liability fears lead physicians to locate in lower-risk jurisdictions (e.g., Matsa 2007; Helland and Seabury 2015; Paik, Black, and Hyman 2016) .
Of more direct relevance to this study, reform advocates also claim that many malpractice claims are frivolous and that many cases with no actual medical error lead to payouts (see literature discussion above). An important policy question is whether hospitals can reduce malpractice risk by making investments that reduce the incidence of medical error.
B. P A T I E N T S A F E T Y
Patient safety has been a focus for the health-care industry in the United States since the publication of the seminal report by the Institute of Medicine, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System (Kohn, Corrigan, and Donaldson 2000) , which brought to public attention the high rate of medical errors in the United States and the resulting death toll. Since the publication of To Err Is Human, increased attention has been paid to measuring patient safety, including identifying sources of medical error, public reporting of patient safety outcomes, and a variety of both voluntary and government-mandated initiatives to reduce the frequency of adverse events.
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) developed the Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) as measures of patient safety that can be calculated using standard hospital inpatient data sets. Hospital inpatient data sets are available in many states, including Florida and Texas. The PSIs are designed to measure often avoidable adverse events in general acute-care hospitals. They were developed by researchers at Stanford University; University of California, Davis; and University of California, San Francisco, under an AHRQ-commissioned project. The development process involved several stages. The researchers began by identifying over 200 potential indicators, assessed their validity, developed a much smaller number of proposed indicators, and conducted a review of the proposed indicators by clinical panels.
2 These measures are widely used to assess patient safety in hospitals; to evaluate the effectiveness of patient safety initiatives; and to study the determinants of patient safety. For example, the Leapfrog Group uses PSIs as part of its annual survey of safety and quality in US hospitals (Leapfrog Group 2015) . Table 1 lists and describes the set of PSIs defined by AHRQ, many of which are severe events, including death. For example, PSI-2 is death in the hospital, for patients with conditions for which in-hospital death is rare. PSI-3 is pressure ulcer, usually due to failure of hospital staff to turn an immobile patient often enough. PSI-4 is death from serious but treatable complications that generally involve medical error to begin with. PSI-5 is leaving a foreign object, usually a sponge, in the body during surgery. PSI-6 is collapsed lung suffered in the hospital. And so on.
For each PSI, AHRQ provides specific criteria for identifying PSI events and determining which patients are at risk for that PSI. These criteria include admission type and source, patient age, ICD-9-CM diagnosis and procedure codes, time between procedure date and adverse event date, Diagnosis Related Group (DRG), Major Diagnostic Category (MDC), length of stay, and patient discharge type. For instance, cases at risk for postoperative sepsis (PSI-13) include all elective surgical discharges (based on DRG and ICD-9-CM codes) of patients 18 and older, excluding discharges where the patient was admitted with sepsis or infection and patients who are immunocompromised or have specified cancers. The count of PSI-13 events is the subset of these cases at risk with an ICD-9-CM code of sepsis in a secondary diagnosis field (AHRQ 2011) .
In this study we interpret PSI events not as event-specific precursors to malpractice claims, but instead as proxies for overall hospital patient safety. Some PSI events could lead to paid malpractice claims, but so could many other adverse outcomes that are not PSIs. The PSIs are imperfect proxies for overall safety in a number of ways. First, the PSIs are based on billing records, rather than full clinical records. The imperfect fit between PSIs and actual adverse events will introduce noise into the PSI measures. This noise may not be random, and thus might bias our estimates, if reporting practices vary across hospitals. However, hospital FE should capture much of this nonrandom variation. Second, the PSIs measure a subset of adverse events. They were designed to (1) capture adverse events that are usually preventable; and (2) have relatively high specificity (the fraction of PSIs which in fact reflect adverse events), at the cost of reduced sensitivity (the fraction of adverse events identified).
A number of studies assess how well the PSIs perform as patient safety measures. We review here some representative studies. Classen et al. (2011) compare PSI rates to a broader set of adverse events identified from clinical records. They find that the PSI measures have specificity of 98.5 percent, but sensitivity of only 8.5 percent. Thus, the PSIs miss many adverse events, but rarely provide false positives. 3 Zhan and Miller (2003) report that patients with PSI events had longer hospital stays and higher mortality, compared with matched patients without PSI events.
4 Singer et al. (2009) report an association between PSI rates and a survey-based measure of the patient safety climate. In contrast, Isaac and Jha (2008) study four PSIs (PSI-2, death in low-mortality DRGs; PSI-3, pressure ulcer; PSI-4, death of surgical inpatients with serious treatable complications; and PSI-7, central venous catheter-related bloodstream infection) for Medicare patients in 2003. They compare PSI rates with (1) risk-adjusted mortality rates; (2) "process measures" of care quality from the HHS Hospital Compare project; and (3) US News hospital rankings. Lower PSI-4 rates predict lower risk-adjusted mortality, but they find mixed results for the other PSIs and the other quality measures. However, there is reason to question their quality measures. The HHS measures are poor predictors of outcomes (e.g., Nicholas et al. 2010 ). The US News rankings largely measure reputation. Whether they capture patient safety or other aspects of overall "quality" is unknown. Also, a measure that pools a number of PSIs could predict overall safety, even if some individual measures do not.
These studies all assess whether the PSIs have good "construct validity" in two senses. First, is the PSI construct a good predictor of the underlying medical event: Do the patients who are coded as having PSIs actually have the underlying condition? Second, do the PSIs predict outcomes: Do patients who are coded as having PSIs realize worse outcomes, on average, than similar patients who do not suffer PSIs? Our overall sense of this research is that the PSIs, especially if pooled, are likely to provide a reasonable, if noisy, proxy for overall patient safety.
There is extensive research, much of it associated with the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care project, on local variation in health-care intensity, and the limited association between treatment intensity and outcomes (e.g., Fisher et al. 2003; Baicker and Chandra 2004) . Only one study examines local variation in patient safety. Thornlow and Stukenborg (2006) study five PSIs (death in low-mortality DRGs, death of a surgical inpatient with serious treatable complications, central line-associated bloodstream infection, postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma, and postoperative respiratory failure). They find that hospital ownership (for profit, nonprofit, or government), location (urban versus rural), and teaching status are weak predictors of PSI rates.
III. Data
To study the association between medical malpractice claim rates and patient safety, we need measures of both. Our measures of malpractice claim rates come from public data sets produced by the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation and the Texas Department of Insurance. These data sets include only closed, paid claims. We lack data on unpaid claims, and learn about claims only when they are closed. We use the claims data sets to estimate paid claims by injury year. We use hospital inpatient data sets from Florida and Texas to compute PSI rates.
a.. florida office of insurance regulation data. Our primary source for malpractice claims data is Florida. The Florida Office of Insurance Regulation provides data on closed, paid medical malpractice claims to researchers for a nominal charge on request (to PublicRecords@floir.com). We use the "current" Florida data set, which includes claims due to injuries between 1994 and 2014. 5 This data set covers claims against both physicians and hospitals. It includes injury setting (e.g., hospital inpatient facility, hospital outpatient facility, physician's office, patient's home) and hospital identifiers, if applicable. Since PSIs are measured in hospitals, we keep only medical malpractice claims where the injury was in a hospital inpatient setting. Moreover, PSIs are intended for use in general acute-care (GAC) hospitals, so we limit the sample to these hospitals. Our final sample includes 219 hospitals, which account for 95 percent of discharges in our inpatient data set. 6 a.. texas department of insurance data. Our second source for malpractice claims data is Texas. The Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) data provide data on five lines of commercial personal liability insurance, including medical malpractice (TDI 2014), for paid claims closed over 1988-2012. 7 The data set includes county of injury, but, unlike Florida, does not include hospital identifiers, so we conduct our Texas analysis at the county level.
a.. time consistency. We discuss Florida here, and discuss Texas in the Online Appendix available on the MITP website (http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl /10.1162/ajhe a 00069) and on SSRN (http://ssrn.com/abstract id=1884630). Figure 1 shows the number of closed, paid medical malpractice claims in Florida by injury year. There is a drop in paid claims beginning in 2004. There are two main reasons for this drop. First, the data are right-censored-they contain only closed claims, so claims for injuries that occurred in more recent years but did not close by the end of 2014 are excluded.
5 Florida medical malpractice data are also available for claim closing years from 1975 to 1993 (with some records extending to 1H 1999) in a different data format. We do not use the earlier data in this study. We discard claims with zero payout since Florida ceased to require reporting of zero payout claims in 1997. 6 We exclude 6 hospitals without names (following advice from the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, the inpatient data provider). We then identify and exclude 69 non-GAC hospitals in several steps. First, we check hospital service type in the American Hospital Association (AHA) survey data, and exclude hospitals that are not "general medical and surgical." For 10 hospitals whose service category changes over time, we use the most common designation. Second, for 27 hospitals that are not in the AHA data, we parse all versions of the hospital name in the inpatient and medical malpractice data sets for character strings that indicate non-GAC status, and classify a hospital as non-GAC if any version of its name contains one or more of the strings, "behavioral," "psychiatric," "long term," "rehab," "addict," "recovery center," "residential," "child," or "specialty." For the 10 remaining hospitals, we conduct a manual Internet search to determine the hospital type. 7 Our criteria for defining a medical malpractice claim follows Paik et al. (2012) : a claim must satisfy at least two of three criteria: (1) payment under medical professional liability insurance; (2) physician or hospital defendant; (3) injuries caused by "complications or misadventures of medical or surgical care." We have cause of injury only for claims with payouts over $25,000 (nominal). We require claims with smaller payouts to meet criteria (1) and (2). The TDI data includes claim-level data only for claims with payouts over $10,000 (nominal). For time consistency, we retain only claims with payouts of at least $10,000 in 1988 dollars (the first data year). The threshold for reporting individual claims rises from $10,000 to $25,000 for claims closed after September 1, 2009. The data set excludes Veterans Administration hospitals, self-insured hospitals, including the University of Texas hospital system, and physicians employed by these hospitals. Second, in 2003, Florida adopted a cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases, which substantially reduced claim rates (Paik, Black, and Hyman 2013) .
To make our measure of malpractice activity more time-consistent, we adjust for these two effects, but as we show below, we obtain very similar results without these adjustments. To correct for right-censoring, due to some claims not having closed by the final data year, we use all claims in the state to estimate the probability 1/ p clos e,l that a medical malpractice claim closes by the end of the year that is l years after the date of injury. We then scale the number of claims in each hospital-year with injury year t by 1/ p clos e,(T −t) , where T is the last year with claims data. This yields the number of claims we ultimately expect for year t, once all claims have closed. Since later years are more affected by censoring, we drop the last three years of claims data. Because of the limited span of the data on PSIs, we also drop claims with injuries before 1999 or after 2010. The dark shaded bars in Figure 1 show the additional paid claims we expect once all claims have closed.
To adjust for the effect of tort reform, we regress the number of claims, adjusted for right-censoring, on year during the pre-reform period. We then use the regression coefficient to predict the statewide number of claims that would be expected without reform in 2003 and later years. For these years, we multiply right-censoring-adjusted claims in each hospital-year by the statewide ratio of (expected claims without reform)/(observed claims), to obtain an estimated number of claims without reform. Figure 1 shows the linear trend line, and the additional claims that would be expected, in 2003 and later years, without tort reform, in light shaded bars. Our regression specifications include year dummies, which control for deviations from the assumed linear trend in claim rates. References below to number of malpractice claims are after these two adjustments.
The bottom panel of Table 2 provides summary statistics for Florida medical malpractice claims. The sample includes 219 distinct Florida hospitals and 2,484 hospital-years over 1999-2010. These hospitals experience 9,743 raw claims and 13,558 adjusted claims.
B. P A T I E N T S A F E T Y D A T A
To detect PSI events, we apply AHRQ's definitions to the state inpatient data sets from Florida and Texas. 8 The Agency for Health Care Administration's inpatient data set file covers all inpatient discharges in Florida. It is available for 1988-2013. This file contains a unique identifier for each discharge, the year and quarter of the discharge, hospital identifiers, patient demographic characteristics, and ICD-9-CM diagnosis and procedure codes. We merge the inpatient data to hospital-level medical malpractice data using the hospital IDs in both data sets.
AHRQ regularly updates the PSI definitions to reflect changes in the ICD-9-CM diagnosis and procedure codes. New ICD-9-CM codes are often more specific than older codes. Unfortunately, switching to newer and often-narrower codes, as AHRQ does, produces time-inconsistent measures of PSI rates. We therefore modify the AHRQ definitions of PSIs to generate measures that are closer to being time-consistent over our study period. All PSI counts use our modified definitions. 9 We have time-consistent definitions over 1999 to 2010, and therefore limit the inpatient data to this period. 10 Our data include roughly 29 million discharges between 1999 and 2010.
We use 17 PSIs (all but PSI-16, which is too infrequent to be usable), which we describe in Table 1 , and list in Table 2 along with summary statistics on the number of PSI events, the number of cases at risk for each PSI, and the PSI rate (per 10,000 cases at risk). There are roughly 500,000 total PSI events in Florida. PSI rates exhibit substantial variation across hospitals, suggesting that hospitals can improve their PSI rates at manageable cost, because some hospitals are achieving lower rates.
Figure 2 provides evidence on this variation. We compute annual rates per 1,000 cases at risk for each PSI for each hospital during the sample period, normalize the PSI-specific rates, and sum these normalized rates for each hospital to compute an overall pooled 8 For details on the Texas inpatient data set, see the Online Appendix, Section C2. 9 Details on our adjustments are available from the authors on request. 10 In work in progress (Black and Zabinski 2016) , we are extending the time-consistency adjustments to before 1999 and after 2010. hospital PSI rate:
.
PSI j Rate it is the number of PSIj events divided by the number of cases at risk for PSIj at hospital i in year t; norm() is a function that converts its argument to mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1 over all hospital-years. To generate Figure 2 , we limit the sample to hospital-years with cases at risk for all of the PSIs, divide hospitals into quintiles based on average number of discharges over our sample period, and show box and whisker plots of time-averaged rates for each hospital [mean t (PooledPSIRate it )]. Larger hospitals tend to have higher PSI rates. This could reflect major "tertiary" hospitals tending to have sicker patients, who need more complex treatment or are more fragile, leading to more adverse events.
11 However, there is also substantial scatter in PSI rates, both within and across quintiles. For example, the top whisker in each quintile is well above the 75th percentile in most other quintiles.
12 Variance decomposition analysis indicates that 86 percent of the variance in PSI rates occurs within discharge quintiles; only 11 Case-mix differs substantially between rural and urban hospitals (VanBibber, Zuckerman, and Finlayson 2006) . 12 Two caveats for the outliers in the box and whiskers plots. First, "outlier" hospitals with low PSI rates could either be doing a good job of preventing adverse events, or a poor job of documenting adverse events. Also, some hospitals, especially smaller ones, may specialize in lower-risk services, leading to lower PSI rates.
F I G U R E 2 . Box and whiskers plots for Florida hospital pooled PSI rates by discharge quintiles
Notes: Box and whiskers plots of hospital pooled PSI rates for hospital size quintiles, based on mean discharges over 1999-2010, for 133 hospitals (1,330 hospital-years) with cases at risk for each PSI. Pooled PSI rate is mean (across years) for hospital k of j in PSI {norm(PSI j rate per 1,000 cases at risk)} kt , with PSI rates normalized to mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1. Boxes give 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles; whiskers give 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles.
14 percent is across quintiles. 13 There is also sufficient variation in PSI rates within hospitals across time, to make feasible our core hospital FE analysis.
C. C O V A R I A T E S
Patient mix should be reasonably stable, and hence largely captured by our hospital FEs. To address remaining variation in patient mix, we include patient demographic characteristics and comorbidity counts as covariates in our regressions. We use the inpatient data to construct these covariates. The demographic variables we use are the fraction of patients, discharged from each hospital, who are female, white, Hispanic, aged 0-4 years the excluded category, 5-19 years, 20-34 years, 35-49 years, 50-64 years, 65-84 years, and 85 + .
We also control for patient health using each of the comorbidities that enter the widely used Charlson comorbidity index (Charlson et al. 1987; Quan et al. 2005 ). The Charlson comorbidity index is based on 17 broad diagnostic categories that predict patient mortality: myocardial infarction; congestive heart failure; peripheral vascular disease; cerebrovascular disease; dementia; chronic pulmonary disease; rheumatic disease; peptic ulcer disease; mild liver disease; moderate or severe liver disease; diabetes without chronic complication; diabetes with chronic complication; renal disease; hemiplegia or paraplegia; any malignancy, including lymphoma and leukemia, except malignant neoplasm of skin; metastatic solid tumor; and AIDS/HIV.
14 We include each as a separate covariate. To address the concern that larger tertiary hospitals may have sicker patients in ways not captured by the Charlson comorbidities, we include the natural logarithm of total discharges as a covariate.
IV. Empirical Strategy
To investigate the relationship between medical malpractice claim rates and PSI rates, we adopt a two-step approach. In the first step, we estimate residual PSI rates and residual medical malpractice claim rates. For PSIs, we estimate the difference between observed PSI events in each hospital-year and the expected number of events, given location (hospital for Florida, county for Texas) and patient characteristics, and use this difference to compute a residual PSI rate. We adopt a similar approach for medical malpractice claims. In the second step, we apply standard panel data methods, in which we regress the residual medical malpractice claim rate on the residual PSI rate and assess the association between the two. We explain below why we choose this approach rather than directly regressing medical malpractice claim rates on PSI rates and covariates.
A. R E S I D U A L P A T I E N T S A F E T Y A N D M E D I C A L M A L P R A C T I C E M E A S U R E S
To compute the residual PSI measures, we first estimate expected PSI events based on the number of inpatient cases at risk for each PSI in each hospital-year, and the covariates discussed above. If hospital i has more (fewer) PSI events of type j than expected, given its size and case mix, it will have a positive (negative) residual for PSIj. Specifically, for each PSIj, we estimate the following, using ordinary least squares (OLS):
where PSIj it is the number of events for PSI type j, in hospital i and year t, CARj it is the number of cases at risk for PSIj, Discharges it is the number of hospital discharges, CharlsonM it is the number of cases with Charlson comorbidity M, the X i are patient demographic variables (aggregated to the hospital level), and PSIjRes it is the regression residual. We add one in the logarithms in order not to lose county-years with zero PSI events, cases at risk, or Charlson comorbidities. By construction, PSIjRes it is uncorrelated with each of the predictors. We present the first-stage results in the Online Appendix, Table B1 . We normalize PSIjRes it for each PSI to mean zero and standard deviation one to make regression coefficients comparable across PSI types, given very different base frequencies for different PSIs. Let norm(X) be the normalized version of variable X. Our "PSIj measure" is then norm(PSIjRes it ).
We also construct a pooled measure of adverse events by summing the individual PSI measures. As noted above, we interpret the PSIs, not as indicating specific events that lead to medical malpractice claims, but instead as proxies for overall patient safety. Our hypothesis is that lower overall safety predicts higher medical malpractice claim rates. Given this use of the PSIs, it seems reasonable to weight each measure equally in constructing the pooled measure.
15 Our "pooled PSI measure" is the renormalized sum of the PSIj measures:
We use a similar approach to measure residual medical malpractice risk. Our measure is the number of closed paid claims in each hospital-year, relative to the number we would expect given the number of cases at risk for each PSI and the same covariates that we use to predict PSIs. We use a flexible specification in which the number of cases at risk for each PSI can separately predict expected medical malpractice claims:
Here MedMal it is the number of medical malpractice claims paid by hospital i for injuries that occurred in year t. Other variables are defined above. A positive (negative) residual indicates that there were more (fewer) medical malpractice claims than expected. One can see the number of discharges as the primary measure of medical activity that generates medical malpractice risk, while PSI cases at risk and our covariates control for time variation in patient mix. We normalize medical malpractice risk measure to mean zero and standard deviation one across all sample years so our "medical malpractice measure" is norm(MedMalRes it ). We provide the first-stage regressions in Online Appendix Table B2 .
As discussed above, we treat the individual PSIs as imperfect proxies for overall hospital safety. Table 3 lists hospital-year-level correlations among the individual PSI measures. Most correlations are positive and statistically significant. A high rate for one PSI predicts high rates for other PSIs, including PSIs that are not directly related and occur in different parts of a hospital. These positive correlations provide evidence that the PSIs include a common core, which we term "overall patient safety." One way to confirm this common core is to apply principal component analysis. The loadings on all the PSIs for the first principal component are positive and similar in magnitude, ranging from 0.165 to 0.332 for all PSIs except PSI-3 (loading = 0.075). The second and higher principal components have no obvious interpretation. The positive correlations also suggest that a pooled measure that combines the PSIs will provide a better proxy for overall patient safety than any individual PSI.
T A B L E 3 . Correlations among individual PSI measures in Florida hospitals
B. R E G R E S S I O N S P E C I F I C A T I O N S
We test whether adverse events predict medical malpractice claim rates using three panel data specifications: pooled OLS, hospital random effects (RE), and hospital fixed effects (FE). We rely principally on the hospital FE specification, but obtain similar results with all three approaches. Our pooled OLS regression specification is
Here norm(MedMalRes it ) is our medical malpractice measure and PooledPSIMeasure it is the pooled PSI measure, both described above; δ t are year dummies and ε it is the error. The parameter of principal interest is γ , which will be positive if PSI rates predict medical malpractice claim rates. The pooled OLS specification will be biased if unobserved hospital-level factors correlate with both medical malpractice activity and PSI rates. We partly address this possibility by controlling for hospital size, measured by ln(Discharges), and other covariates, when we estimate residual PSI and malpractice claim rates. We further address the risk of bias by adding hospital effects, using RE and FE specifications. We estimate the following model, where u i is the hospital effect:
The pooled OLS and RE models make a "strict exogeneity" assumption; one form of this assumption is that the hospital effects are independent of other regressors in all time periods, Cov(u i , x i,t ) = 0 ∀ t. The FE model is consistent even if the hospital effects are correlated with other regressors, but has weaker power to detect an association between PSI rates and medical malpractice claims rates because it uses only within-hospital variation over time. In all regressions, we cluster standard errors on hospital to address potential within-hospital correlation of the errors.
Our two-stage approach has several advantages over a one-stage regression, with claims (or claim rates) as the dependent variable, PSIs (or PSI rates) as independent variables, and patient and hospital characteristics as covariates. First, PSIs vary greatly in frequency (see Table 2 ). The two-stage approach lets us give the same weight to variation in a high-frequency PSI such as pressure ulcer (PSI-3), as to a low frequency but more serious PSI, such as foreign object left in body during surgical procedure (PSI-5). There is no obvious way to give equal weight to variation in each PSI in a one-stage regression. Second, our approach lets the impact of covariates vary across PSIs. A one-stage regression would not readily allow this. 16 Note that if we use a single PSI to measure patient safety, one-and two-stage regressions will give the same results in pooled OLS and FE specifications (this is the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem; e.g., Hansen (2015; Theorem 3.15 .1)).
C. C H I L D B I R T H R E G R E S S I O N S P E C I F I C A T I O N S
For the most part, we cannot link specific types of PSIs to similar types of medical malpractice claims. Childbirth is a partial exception, which allows us to test whether variation in the childbirth-specific PSIs predicts variation in childbirth-related malpractice claims. The Florida data do not allow us to further separate mother claims from baby claims. 17 We identify 1,695 birth-related claims over 1994-2014. We test whether a residual measure of childbirth claims (constructed similarly to our overall malpractice claims measure) is predicted by (1) the PSI measures for each of PSI-17 (birth injury to neonate), PSI-18 (injury to mother for vaginal delivery with instrument), and PSI-19 (injury to mother for vaginal delivery without instrument); and (2) a pooled measure for all three birth PSIs. We construct the pooled birth PSI measure in the same way as the overall pooled PSI measure except that we sum only over the measures for PSIs 17-19.
V. Results for Florida
A. R E S U L T S W I T H P O O L E D P S I M E A S U R E
We find a strong, positive relationship between the pooled PSI measure and the malpractice measure (coefficient = 0.113, t = 3.33) in a graphical analysis (see Figure 3) .
We also find a strong positive relationship between the pooled PSI measure and the malpractice claims measure in regression analyses (see Table 4 ). This relationship is consistent across pooled OLS, hospital random-effects, and hospital fixed-effects specifications.
Using the full sample period, 1999-2010, we find a coefficient of 0.141 (t = 3.63) in the hospital FE specification (see Table 4 , panel C, column 1). A correlated random-effects (CRE) test for equality of coefficients between RE and FE (Wooldridge 2013, § 14. 3) produces a t-statistic of only 0.48. This suggests that hospital effects are not important, and that the statistically stronger RE results (coefficient = 0.129; t = 4.37) are likely to be reliable.
18 16 We have too few hospital-year observations (2,484) to make feasible a one-stage model in which we interact each covariate with each of the PSI dummies. 17 To find birth-related claims, we begin with free text fields in the database for final diagnosis, misdiagnosis, cause of injury, and principal injury. We parse the text for terms such as "neonate" and "labor." The full list of terms was the following: neonate, newborn, new born, infant, baby, birth, stillborn, still born, fetus, fetal, delivery, C-section, cesarean section, labor, NICU, utero. 18 The CRE model adds the time mean of the pooled PSI measure to the RE model in equation 6. The t-statistic for this variable tests whether RE and FE coefficients are different. The CRE test has several We present robustness checks in Table 4 , columns 2 and 3. In column 2, we drop 2010, the last year of the sample period. This year has the noisiest measure of malpractice claims because a small fraction of claims with injuries in 2010 closed by the end of our data period, so 2010 has the fewest number of closed claims. In column 3, we use the raw number of paid malpractice claims to construct the malpractice measure, rather than the adjusted number of claims. This makes the claim rate less time-consistent, but year dummies should largely capture the effect of the adjustments, and the adjustments could introduce noise. The FE coefficient on the pooled PSI measure rises to 0.168 (t = 4.31).
We can use the coefficients from Table 4 to estimate the effect of increased safety (proxied by fewer PSI events) on the malpractice claim rates-in effect, an elasticity of paid claims with regard to PSI events. Online Appendix A provides details on how we compute this elasticity. Our hospital FE results, from Table 4 , panel C, column 1, imply that a one standard deviation reduction in each PSI rate would decrease paid medical malpractice claims by 16.2 percent. Thus, if our results are causal, achievable improvements in patient safety could significantly reduce the malpractice claim risk that hospitals face, in addition to their direct benefits for patients.
advantages over the more familiar Hausman test: (1) one can use clustered standard errors; (2) one can test for different FE and RE coefficients both for a specific variable of interest and for multiple regression coefficients together (the Hausman test applies only to all variables together); (3) in our experience in other studies, the Hausman test often fails to run.
T A B L E 4 . Regressions of medical malpractice measure on pooled PSI measure: Florida
Dependent variable
Medical malpractice measure
Sample period 1999-2010 1999-2009 1999-2010 Use 
B. R E S U L T S W I T H I N D I V I D U A L P S I M E A S U R E S
As a further robustness check, which can address the concern that our results are driven by how we pool the PSIs, we repeat the regressions presented in Table 4 using each of the individual PSI measures, one at a time, instead of the pooled PSI measure (see Table 5 ).
Across specifications, almost all of the coefficients are positive. 5 percent level or better), six are significant with hospital RE, and four are significant with hospital FE. These results further support an association between overall patient safety and malpractice risk, with the individual PSIs serving as imperfect proxies for patient safety. The consistent results across individual PSIs imply that the results for the pooled PSI measure, presented in Table 4 , are not sensitive to how we construct the pooled measure.
The coefficients for individual PSIs are generally lower in magnitude than for the pooled PSI measure. This is expected, since individual PSI measures are noisier proxies for overall patient safety, and measurement error in an independent variable biases coefficients toward zero (e.g., Wooldridge 2013, ch. 9).
C. R E S U L T S W I T H A L T E R N A T I V E P S I P O O L I N G M E T H O D S
We further confirm that our results for the pooled PSI measure are not sensitive to how we construct this measure, by using two alternative pooling approaches. First, we include all 17 individual PSI measures in a single regression, and sum the coefficients on these measures. The sum of the coefficients on the individual PSI measures is positive and statistically significant across specifications 0.266 (t = 3.80) for pooled OLS, 0.274 (z = 4.43) with hospital RE, and 0.301 (t = 3.74) with hospital FE.
Second, we conduct principal components analysis, in which we replace the pooled PSI measure with the normalized first principal component of the individual PSI measures. The coefficients on the first principal component are close to those reported in Table 4 . For example, the hospital FE coefficient is 0.137 (t = 3.46), versus the 0.141 coefficient reported in Table 4 .
D. B I R T H C L A I M S
For malpractice claims related to childbirth, we are able to assess whether the birth-specific PSIs predict birth-related claim rates. We find that both the three individual birth-related PSIs and a pooled PSI measure that combines all three of these PSIs take positive coefficients across pooled OLS, hospital RE, and hospital FE specifications (see Table 6 ). All coefficients are statistically significant with pooled OLS and hospital RE. With hospital FE, the coefficients for PSI-19 and for the pooled birth PSIs (17-19) are statistically significant. The coefficient on the pooled birth PSI measure with hospital FE is 0.110 (t = 2.72); this is comparable in magnitude to the 0.141 coefficient on the pooled PSI measure in Table 4 , which includes all PSIs and all claims.
VI. Results for Texas
The Florida data provide hospital-level data on malpractice claims, and also let us link the rates of birth claims to birth-specific PSIs. But relying only on Florida data creates the risk that our results may be driven by something specific to Florida. We therefore conduct a similar analysis using malpractice claims data from Texas, the only other state with publicly available data. In Texas, we have claims data only at the county level. Hence the strongest available design relies on county FE; we cannot use the hospital FE that were 
A. O V E R A L L T E X A S R E S U L T S
Our Texas results are statistically strong, and the coefficients on the pooled PSI measure are quite similar to the Florida results. For example, the coefficient on the pooled PSI measure in Texas with county FE is 0.130 (t = 2.76; see Table 7 ), compared with a coefficient of 0.141 in Florida with hospital FE. As in Florida, results are similar if we drop the last sample year, and are stronger if we use the raw rather than the adjusted number of claims. The county FE results imply that a one standard deviation reduction in each PSI rate (with standard deviations measured at the hospital-year level) predicts a 16.8 percent drop in paid malpractice claims.
The pooled OLS and county RE coefficients are larger than the county FE coefficients (unlike Florida, where all coefficients were similar), and the CRE test mildly rejects equality of coefficients (t = 1.84). The differences in estimates across methods could 19 In Texas, unlike Florida, we cannot identify which malpractice claims were due to injuries suffered while a hospital inpatient. Thus, our malpractice risk measure is based on all paid claims in a county-year. In Texas, we base demographic characteristics on county characteristics, obtained from the Census Bureau (see http://www.tsl.state.tx.us/ref/abouttx/census.html), rather than on the characteristics of patients in each hospital. Our covariates are per capita income and the fractions of the population: living in rural areas, over age 62, white, and Hispanic. reflect the cruder nature of the county-level Texas analysis, versus the hospital-level Florida analysis.
B. B I R T H C L A I M S
In Texas, we can identify "newborn" claims, based on age at the time of injury less than one month; most but not all of these will involve birth injury. We cannot identify mother claims due to injury during childbirth. We find that the PSI-17 measure (PSI-17 is birth injury to neonate) predicts a measure of residual newborn malpractice claims (see the Online Appendix, Table C5 , for the regression results). The coefficients on the PSI-17 measure are positive across pooled OLS, county RE, and county FE specifications, are statistically significant for the pooled OLS and county RE specifications, and are positive and marginally significant (coefficient = 0.072; t = 1.73) with county FE.
VII. Discussion
A. O V E R V I E W
We find a strong positive association in Florida between adverse patient safety events in hospitals and the number of medical malpractice claims paid by these hospitals. Our results are both statistically strong and "economically" meaningful: a one standard deviation reduction in PSI rates predicts a 16.2 percent fall in paid malpractice claims. The association that we find is likely to be causal. We lack an external shock to patient safety, and thus cannot implement a true causal design. However, we have a strong empirical specification, with hospital FE and extensive patient-level covariates covering both health and demographic characteristics. Variation within hospitals across time in patient safety events, proxied by the Patient Safety Indicators developed by AHRQ, strongly predicts variation within hospitals across time in the same hospitals in paid malpractice claims. Reverse causality cannot explain our results-it would predict the opposite (negative) sign on our PSI measures. Higher malpractice risk should induce greater safety efforts, and hence reduce PSI rates. Two recent studies exploit legal shocks to malpractice risk and find evidence consistent with this prediction (Iizuka 2013; Zabinski and Black 2015; although Frakes and Jena (forthcoming) find no significant effect). This evidence suggests that our results may understate the causal effect of patient safety on medical malpractice claims.
Omitted variable bias cannot be ruled out, but it is unclear what omitted variable(s) might be time varying (our hospital FE control for time-invariant omitted variables) and unrelated to patient safety yet predict time variation in both patient safety and malpractice claims within hospitals-both overall and specifically for childbirth claims-in a way that could explain our results. Any such omitted variable cannot be specific to Florida, because we obtain similar results for Texas. We also obtain very similar coefficient estimates across pooled OLS, hospital RE, and hospital FE models, suggesting that hospital characteristics-for example, larger, tertiary hospitals often see sicker patients-are not important drivers of our results. We also include extensive covariates, including the 17 measures that enter the Charlson comorbidity index. This should help to remove the effect of variation in patient mix within hospitals over time.
B. V A R I A T I O N I N P S I R A T E S A C R O S S H O S P I T A L S
We find large variation in PSI rates across similar-sized hospitals. This suggests that many hospitals can reduce adverse patient safety events at reasonable cost, because their peers are doing so. Why then don't more hospitals devote more effort to this important task?
Here we can only speculate, but in the big picture, the financial incentives for hospitals to improve patient safety, including the incentives provided by malpractice liability, are weak. Mello et al. (2007) find that hospitals are largely insulated from the financial costs of patient injuries. Krupka, Sandberg, and Weeks (2012) report that hospitals earn higher revenue when surgical patients suffer complications than when they do not. For PSI-5 (foreign body left during procedure), O'Connor (2012) reports that only about 1 percent of hospitals have installed inexpensive sponge-tracking systems for surgeries, which could reduce PSI-5 rates to nearly zero. For PSI-7 (central line-associated bloodstream infections), Herzer et al. (2014) conduct a cost-benefit analysis of a multihospital central line-associated bloodstream infections reduction program and estimate hospital cost at roughly $20,000 per infection prevented. This cost is outweighed by the large benefits to patients from these serious, often fatal, infections. However, these prevention programs are costly to hospitals, which both incur safety costs and lose the extra revenue that they often earn from treating these infections.
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C. L I M I T A T I O N S O F O U R S T U D Y
c.. no exogenous shock to psi rates. We have no exogenous shock to PSI rates, or plausible instrumental variables for these rates, and thus cannot implement a true causal research design. We do benefit, however, from the damage caps adopted by Florida and Texas during our sample period. These reforms are not a direct shock to PSI rates, but do provide a shock to hospital incentives to limit PSIs. c.. imperfect measure of patient safety. We rely on imperfect measures of both patient safety and malpractice claim rates. We see the PSIs as proxiesconstructs-for unobserved underlying patient safety. Noise in these proxies can be seen as a form of measurement error, which will bias our estimated coefficients toward zero. c.. imperfect measure of malpractice risk. Our medical malpractice claims data are also not ideal. We have data from only two states, albeit large and diverse ones. We have hospital-level data only in Florida. We obtain data on claims only when they close, which limits the available sample period. We also have data only on paid claims. Data on all claims that are brought, including unpaid claims, would provide a useful and somewhat different measure of malpractice risk.
VIII. Conclusion
We study whether PSI rates predict paid medical malpractice claim rates in Florida and Texas. We find a strong correlation between the individual PSI measures for most PSIs. This suggests that the PSIs, especially when pooled, are a reasonable proxy for overall patient safety in hospitals. We then find evidence for Florida of a strong positive association between PSI rates and medical malpractice claim rates, with a strong empirical specification that includes hospital fixed effects and extensive patient-level covariates. We confirm that a similar association holds for Texas, with county fixed effects.
These associations are likely to be causal. They suggest that hospitals that invest in patient safety can significantly reduce malpractice claims-a one standard deviation drop in PSI rates predicts a 16 percent drop in malpractice claims.
